The Misery of Mitra:
Considering Criminal Punishment for Computer Crimes
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Introduction
Rajib Mitra always had an interest in computers; his mother introduced him to
amateur radios when he was a child and he lived a stereotypical techno-geek lifestyle: an
ex-girlfriend described as being just as interested in computers as her, and another
girlfriend he met online.2 His undergraduate major was computer science and his two
years of work after college were in software engineering.3
Mitra received a B.S. in computer science from the University of Wisconsin in
2000; he also already had a history of two prior convictions of malicious activity with
computers. In 2003, Mitra was now pursuing an MBA at the University’s graduate
business school in Madison, Wisconsin.4
The city uses Smartnet II, a computer-based radio system that coordinates
communication between the police, fire and other public safety and emergency agencies
for the city. The system creates “talk groups” which allows for coordination between any
users of the system. Utilizing twenty channels, the system makes effective use of the full
radio spectrum. Between January and August of 2003, the system was rendered unusable
with blackouts of availability. These events were occasional and spread out. 5
The City was able to eventually locate the source of a signal that was causing the
blackout. The culprit was Mitra.6
Mitra was charged under the recently revised Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 18
U.S.C.A. § 1030. Showing no remorse, he appealed and spoke before an appellate panel
including Judge Easterbrook of the Seventh Circuit. He claimed he had done nothing
wrong and that the eight-year sentence imposed on him was not fair.7
Was the misery that Mitra was experiencing “fair”? The changes made to the Act
that Mitra was charged under were made after the terrorist attacks of Sept. 11, 2001 as
amended by the USA PATRIOT Act of 20018 and by the Cyber Security Enhancement
Act pf 2002.9 The judges called Mitra a “domestic terrorist,”10 which seemed to reflect
the original rationale for the increases in punishment.
This paper analyzes the policies and philosophy of punishment for computer
crimes under the post-Sept. 11th regime. I argue that the judicial discourse represented in
Mitra represents a willingness to use the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act to go after
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defendants that cause trouble with critical infrastructures, the so-called “domestic
terrorist.” This is manifested in the levels of punishments for such offenses and calls into
question whether the traditional theories of punishment are applicable. I argue that as a
policy, it makes good sense but the hazy definitions of terrorism may present problems
for its success, and instead an approach that takes into consideration the perpetrators may
help facilitate a resolution to this problem.
I first give a discussion of the historical background and context to §1030. Next, I
discuss the increase in punishment levels in § 1030. I then give a discussion about the
pervasiveness of computer-chip technology and apply Mitra. Then, I analyze this in the
context of theories of punishment, and discuss and present a solution to this slipperyslope problem.
Background
Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 18 U.S.C.A § 1030(c)

Congress passed the Counterfeit Access Device and Computer Fraud and Abuse
Act of 198411 in the face of the rise of crime and computers in the country. Congress had
been relying on the old mail and wire-fraud statutes to deal with these new, but
increasingly prevalent crimes. But issues relating to sufficiency of interstate commerce
pushed Congress to pass the Act to deal specifically with the new breed of crimes.12
The original 1984 Act dealt specifically with government computers that had
classified defense, foreign relations information, financial institution and consumer
reporting agency files.13 This represented the first time computers were dealt with as
either a medium for crime or to facilitate a crime.14
Subsequent development of computer crime laws may be categorized into two
groups: the first involves further amendments to this 1984 Act; the latter involves the
subsequent amendments of existing traditional crimes to include the scope of computers
and to adjust punishments as necessary.15
The scope of this paper will only consider the former of these two developments.
The continuing evolution of the 1984 Act yields a microcosm to study punishment’s
social and public policies.
The 1984 Act was drastically reformed with the National Information
Infrastructure Protection Act of 1996.16 Subsequent amendments were made in 2001 with
the USA PATRIOT ACT, the Cyber Security Act of 2002 and the Computer Software
Privacy and Control Act of 2004. Separating out into seven different subsections, the Act
of today codifies criminal activity with computers. In Figure 1, the contents of the Act are
summarized.
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Figure 1 – Anatomy of 18 U.S.C.A. § 1030.
(a)
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
(g)

Unlawful acts
Access, or exceeding authorized access and obtaining of
confidential information
Access or exceeding authorized access to financial records,
government agency, or interstate or foreign communications
Access to government computer
Accesses or exceeding authorized access to commit fraud
Transmission of a malcode17 to cause damage
Defraud traffics
Extortion
Attempt clause for all acts in (a)
Punishment
Government enforcement, authority
Lexicon
Non-applicability to lawful intelligence
Civil actions

We are most interested in subsection (c), which sets out punishment guidelines. Before
we examine this though, let us consider an early case and the resulting punishment from
the early version of the Act.
An Early Case: U.S. v. Morris(1988)

The earliest case regarding computers and crime is perhaps U.S. v. Morris.18 It is
apparent from the word usage itself that technology was still quite novel to the courts. For
instance, consider Judge Jon Newman’s writing of the facts: “Morris released into
INTERNET, a national computer network, a computer program known as a “worm” that
spread and multiplied, eventually causing computers at various educational institutions
and military sites to “crash” or cease functioning.”19
The complete capitalization of the word INTERNET alone is enough to suggest
the novelty of the technology to the court in 1990 when the case was argued. The further
definition of “crash” points to the stretching of the bounds of the lexicon of crimes.
Morris was a first-year graduate student at Cornell University’s computer science
program. As a student in October 1988, he began work on the piece of malcode that
would eventually be deployed into the Internet. His goal was to show the chinks in the
Internet’s security system by reproducing itself and installing itself on machines
throughout the Internet.20 Numerous machines were affected, as much as 10 percent of
the Internet at that time, resulting in damage between then-estimated $100,000 and $10
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million.21 Again, this represents the new difficulty in placing damages on this new
phenomenon of computer outages.
Morris was found guilty by a jury trial for violating 18 U.S.C. § 1030(a)(5)(A).
His sentence was three years of probation, 400 hours of community service and a
monetary fine of $10,050 plus the costs of his supervision.22 The court noted that Morris
tried to mitigate the problem by sending out a message over the Internet on how to fix the
problem. The network was swamped however and it was simply too late.23
The Morris worm, as the literature now calls the malcode, prompted the Defense
Adavanced Research Programs Agency (DARPA) to create the Computer Emergency
Response Team, which today is a first-line mechanism to deal with malcode attacks.24
Incidentally, Morris is an assistant professor today at the Massachusetts Institute
of Technology.25
Increased punishment

Figure 2 below denotes the structure of punishment for an offense under § 1030.
Contrast that with the 1990 version of the same subsection in Figure 3.
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Figure 2 -- §1030 (c), current through Sept 9, 200526
(c)
Punishment
(a)(1) offense
(A) Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than ten years, first
time § 1030 offender.
(B)
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than twenty years,
repeat §1030 offender.
(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(5)(A)(iii) and (a)(6) offenses
(A) Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than one year, first
time § 1030 offender.
(B)
(a)(2) offense only – fine and/or imprisonment of no more
than five years for (i) offense was for commercial or
financial gain; (ii) furthered any criminal or tortious act; (iii)
value of the information obtained exceeds $5,000
(C)
For (a)(2), (a)(3), or (a)(6) – fine and/or imprisonment of no
more than ten years for §1030 repeat offender.
(a)(4), (a)(7), (a)(5)(A)(iii)
(A) For (a)(4), (a)(7)– fine and/or imprisonment of no more than
five years for first time § 1030 offender.
(B)
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than ten years, repeat
§1030 offender.
(a)(5)(a)(i), (a)(5)(a)(ii) (except as provided by ¶5)
(A) (a)(5)(a)(i) -- Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than ten
years.
(B)
(a)(5)(a)(ii) -- Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than five
years.
(C)
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than twenty years,
repeat §1030 offender.
(a)(5)(A)(i)
(A) Knowingly or recklessly causes serious bodily injury -- Fine
and/or imprisonment of no more than twenty years.
(B)
Knowingly or recklessly causes death -- Fine and/or
imprisonment of any years or for life.
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(c)
(1)
(A)
(B)
(2)
(A)
(B)
(3)
(A)
(B)

Figure 3 -- §1030 (c), USCA 1990 edition
Punishment
(a)(1) offense
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than ten years, first
time § 1030 offender.
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than twenty years,
repeat §1030 offender.
(a)(2), (a)(3), (a)(6) offenses
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than one year, first
time §1030 offender.
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than ten years repeat
§1030 offender.
(a)(4), (a)(5)
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than five years for first
time § 1030 offender.
Fine and/or imprisonment of no more than ten years, repeat
§1030 offender.

Mitra and Morris both perpetrated different crimes and expressed different sentiments
about their guilt. Mitra denied to the very end he had done anything wrong and Morris
was contrite and showed his good-faith nature in his attempts to mitigate the harm he had
caused.
The disparity in sentences is startling as is the contrast in the punishment
paragraph of §1030. On first glance, the 1990 version is noticeably simpler and cleaner.
The additions in the current version, after only 15 years reflect the added clauses of
punishable crimes of §1030(a),(b).
In June 1996, the U.S. Sentencing Commission concluded a report surveying sixty
cases between 1988 and 1996. They reported that,
Federal “computer crime” cases sentenced under the pertinent provisions of 18
U.S.C. § 1030 are relatively uncommon at present. An estimated 60 defendants
have been successfully prosecuted and sentenced thereunder in the almost nine
years since the guidelines came into existence…. Computer crime defendants
receive downward departures from guideline ranges more frequently than do other
‘white collar’ defendants or federal defendants generally.27
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Despite these findings, the Commission still did not make a recommendation for a change
in punishment schemes. They wrote, “The limited empirical data available to the
Commission and other factors preclude a definite assessment of the deterrent effect of
existing guidelines for computer fraud and computer vandalism.”28
In 2003, after the Homeland Security Act of 200229 was passed, the Commission
issued a report evaluating the increased penalties that had been put into place for cyber
security offenses.30 It was the first computer crime report the Commission had issued
since its 1996 report and it made a single recommendation this time – they recommended
increasing statutory maximum penalties for §1030(a)(1) violations, which relate to
accessing of national security information.31 Their rationale was related to the terrorism
penalty enhancements for certain crimes from the USA PATRIOT Act, which were
above the maximums proscribed in §1030(c).32
Congress has not passed any act to date regarding this recommendation to date.
Theories of Punishment
The classical division of theories of punishments seeks to represent the range of
reasons why we seek to punish members of our society. Philosophically, there are two
main camps for punishment: utilitarianism and retributivism.33
Retributivism deals with an idea of just-desserts. People who commit crimes
should answer to their actions. This is a backward looking approach that considers the
past actions and seeks to justify the punishment solely on the crime that was committed.34
Utilitarianism on the other hand seeks to please overall society. Based on Jeremy
Bentham’s writing human being’s nature as creatures of pain and pleasure will affect
their actions in their deciding to commit a crime necessarily. In a sense, this is a forwardlooking approach; potential criminals will consider the consequences of their actions on
themselves.35
The Sentencing Commission most likely reflects this latter approach. It mentions
ideas of deterring potential offenders by increasing the punishment levels.
Though the reports to Congress seem to suggest only this area of reasoning, the
Commission and other members of the legal community have struggled with determining
sentencing guidelines. In October 2000, the Commission held a national symposium on
Federal Sentencing Policy for Economic Crimes and New Technology Offenses in
Arlington, Virginia, outside of the nation’s capital. The symposium considered a wide
range of issues in addition to computer crimes.
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One panel had a vibrant exchange on the issue of approaches to punishment
beyond deterrence. Judge J. Phil Gilbert responded to a question about deterring effects
from sentencing guidelines:
The deterrence? I have always advocated to our U.S. Attorney, why don't you get
billboards and go into these areas where there are high amounts of drug offenses
and just put up what the guidelines are? You know, the deterrence is what the
press reports people are sentenced to; people read about what someone was
sentenced to in a fraud case or theft case. You don't have the guidelines
distributed like phone books. I have people appear before me and ask them,
"Well, did you know what the guidelines were before you committed this
offense?" They say," Heck, no." They didn't even know about guidelines. … You
can't limit it to just deterrence. You have got to talk about just punishment and
proportionality and you have got to look at the whole picture. You just can't pick
one item out. 36
This conversation seems to be absent from the reports of the Commission however. The
latest – and only -- recommendations of the Commission seem to deal with deterring
terrorist and critical infrastructure problems.
There are other theories of punishment however. For instance, modern
utilitarianism has the notion of rehabilitation – making the punishment try to “fix” the
criminal. There is also the idea of denunciation. A good example of this is the scarlet
letter that is affixed to the bosom of Hester Prynne, an adulteress in Puritanical
America.37
As applied to the context of §1030 crimes however, these two theories may still
be considered, though their appropriateness as the old saying, “make the punishment fit
the crime,” would be in question.
A Slippery Slope
Now that the groundwork regarding the background of §1030 and theories of
punishment has been set, the question turns to the appropriateness and the implications of
the punishment for the offenses.
The Sentencing Commission has made recommendations for penalties only along
the vein of deterring terrorist or critical infrastructure claims. Combining this with a plain
reading of Mitra however, I argue that a slippery slope ensues to crimes in general.
Mitra argues that a close reading of the statute would have found him to be guilty,
but Congress could not have meant it to work in that way. There was no stealing of
financial information, or crashing computers; instead, “all he did was gum up a radio
system.”38 The theory that Mitra is being held on deals with the fact that there is a
computer chip in the hardware of the radio system. This would include just bout every
electronic gadget in the world.39
36
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The court responds that of course Congress could “not contemplate or intend this
particular application of the statute.” But, the increasing complexity of technology in
society today is an impetus for the need to write general statutes since they cannot and
most likely aren’t complete experts on the fields of technology.40
The implication from this is that anyone that commits a crime under this now
lower threshold for criminality would suffer the higher levels of punishment. Ostensibly,
though this was not argued in the opinion of the case, a question of what is terrorism,
especially this new brand of “domestic terrorism,”41 the threshold to be found a domestic
terrorist is also lower.
The public policy results from this are dangerous; the original purpose to punish
to deter society occurs, but at the cost of civil liberties to society. Administrative ease to
prosecute anyone for almost anything seems to be on the horizon. Is there a way to
balance the needs to protect society by having good punishment schemes and also to
allow only the appropriate level of punishment for wrongdoers still?
Towards a Solution: Considering Internal and External Perspectives
The Mitra court was correct in its assessment of the rate of technology change and
increasing complexity in society today. However, it stops short of asking what the role of
the judge and jury is in assessing whether or not the statute extends to the situation at
hand. The perspective that the court took was one of an external perspective.
Prof. Orin Kerr has developed the notion of external and internal perspectives
regarding how we apply the law to the Internet. “[W]e must first decide whether to apply
the law to the facts as seen from the viewpoint of physical reality or virtual reality.”42
Kerr goes on to propose a framework that tries to resolve the problem. The most salient
point for the purposes of this paper is to follow the perspective of the person the law
seeks to regulate. In this scheme, a conflicting usage of perspectives; one external by the
law enforcement, and the other internal by the alleged perpetrator is mediated by
balancing the two perspectives in a sort of totality of the circumstances consideration.43
Admittedly Kerr’s model deals with the Internet and cyber-crimes; Mitra deals
with a radio system that had computer chips in it. But are the two really that far apart?
The Internet is a specific instance of a network of computers. The radio system in this
case, which uses the public airways and regulated by the FCC, as the court pointed out44
is a “virtual world” in a sense also.
Mitra’s obstinacy in that he did not do anything serious can be interpreted as his
thinking of just playing games and not really causing anything seriously wrong. To be
called a terrorist, which is an external perspective seemed tantamount to a completely
disorienting situation.
If we were to consider Kerr’s point to follow the internal perspective of Mitra,
would we reach a different result? Perhaps not. A reasonable “geek” would still know
40
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about the seriousness of playing with critical infrastructure for his city. But, it would at
least provide some mitigation if Mitra were Morris – someone experimenting to try to
figure out the chinks in the armor of the system, so to speak.
Consequently, the Commission has its approach wrong; by increasing the
maximum penalties, it is not truly deterring the population from these potentially
problematic acts; it also may target the Morris’ who are trying to contribute something
positive to society. If an internal perspective is applied by the courts then that wl lead to
appropriate decisions of punishment.
Conclusion
The challenges presented by high innovating societies, and a different set of
crimes that are considered because of the emergence of computers presents difficult
considerations for how society should treat and punish these new crimes. Liberty and
freedom of society cannot be compromised wholesale however in the name of
administrative ease and the present-division between the technologically savvy and not
will narrow over time, but draconian laws must never be allowed to take root.
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